More than 42,000 dead in #Syria conflict, watchdog says

At least 42,000 people have been killed in violence since an uprising broke out against the rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in March last year, a monitoring group said on Thursday.

“At least 29,455 civilians have been killed, as have 1,426 troops who defected to the opposition and 10,551 soldiers,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights director Rami Abdel Rahman told AFP.

“An additional 652 people whose identity we have been unable to identify have been killed in the conflict,” Abdel Rahman said. “A total of 42,084 people have died in the past 21 months.”

The conflict started as a peaceful protest movement but escalated into an armed rebellion when the authorities used deadly force against demonstrators.

The Observatory counts non-army combatants who have taken up arms against the regime as civilians.

“When the crisis comes to an end, it is likely that we will find many more have been killed, because many thousands are missing in Syria’s jails,” Abdel Rahman said.

In addition, neither the army nor the rebels are willing to reveal their full casualty lists, he said. “That is part of their propaganda war.”

-AFP


December 6 2012

Syrians running out of ways to escape conflict: Red Cross #Syria

The spread of Syria’s civil war has made it increasingly difficult for civilians to escape the conflict, and many are afraid to seek medical care, the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross said on Thursday.

“Through the spreading of the fighting people lose … escape routes out of the fights,” Peter Maurer told reporters in Stockholm after a meeting with Sweden’s Development Aid Minister Gunilla Carlsson.

“In summer, when fighting was going on in Aleppo and Homs, you could still move to Idlib or to some other places. Those places are increasingly rare because fighting is covering more parts of Syria.”

The latest toll brought the number of people killed in 20 months of violence in the country to more than 40,000, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Maurer also warned that “a much deeper humanitarian crisis” would unfold if attacks on medical workers and ambulances continued.

“The general population of Syria is afraid to see medical doctors and go to hospital because hospitals have become” military targets, he said.

Although the aid agency has managed to double the amount of aid brought into the country over the past three months, it was sometimes difficult to negotiate access for “neutral, impartial” deliveries in the highly polarised country, he added.

The Syrian uprising began as peaceful reform protests last year, inspired by the Arab Spring. It has since been transformed into an armed insurgency after the government began crushing demonstrations.

Most rebels, like the population, are Sunni Muslims in a country dominated by a minority regime of Alawites, an offshoot of Shiite Islam.

#Syria says ‘ready to discuss’ Assad exit

22/08/12

Syria said it is ready to discuss the departure of President Bashar al-Assad as part of a negotiated settlement to the increasingly ferocious conflict but the US reacted with scepticism.

The surprise comments Tuesday by a Syrian envoy visiting Moscow emerged after Russia bluntly told the West not to meddle in Syria in the wake of US President Barack Obama’s warning to Damascus over its chemical weapons arsenal.

In Syria, at least 198 people were killed nationwide on Tuesday, a watchdog said, reporting relentless shelling and fighting across swathes of the main battleground of Aleppo and many deaths in a bloody raid on a Damascus suburb.

“As far as his resignation goes — making the resignation itself a condition for holding dialogue means that you will never be able to reach this dialogue,” Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil said after talks in Moscow.

But he added: “Any problems can be discussed during negotiations. We are even ready to discuss this issue.”

According to political sources in Damascus, Jamil was sent to Moscow to discuss a possible plan for a presidential election in Syria in which all candidates would be allowed to stand, including Assad.

The exiled opposition umbrella group the Syrian National Council said it was studying the formation of a transitional government, but did not elaborate on whether it could include regime figures.

And the United States reacted with scepticism.

“We saw the reports of the press conference that the deputy prime minister gave. Frankly, we didn’t see anything terribly new there,” State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said.

“We still believe that the faster Assad goes, the more chance there is to quickly move on to the day after.”

The West has long demanded Assad’s departure, accusing him of butchering his own people during a 17-month conflict that began as a peaceful uprising but has deteriorated into a brutal fight between regime forces and armed rebels.

Syria’s traditional allies Russia and China have blocked UN resolutions on the conflict, rejecting what they see as foreign attempts at regime change, leaving the international community deeply divided over how to end the conflict.

Activists say more than 23,000 people have been killed since March 2011, while the UN puts the death toll at 17,000 and says hundreds of thousands more have fled or been made homeless in a major humanitarian crisis.

Obama had put Assad’s regime on notice Monday that although he had not ordered military action “at this point,” Washington would regard any recourse by Damascus to its deadly arsenal as crossing a “red line.”

“There would be enormous consequences if we start seeing movement on the chemical weapons front or the use of chemical weapons,” he told reporters.

Syria admitted in July that it has chemical weapons and could use them in case of any “external aggression” but not against its own people.

Jamil brushed off Obama’s comments as “simply propaganda” linked to the November presidential election while Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said: “There should be no interference from the outside.”

“The only thing that foreign players should do is create conditions for the start of dialogue,” Lavrov said, but also told Jamil that efforts by Damascus to end the conflict were “not enough.”

Jamil is also trying to seal a deal for fuel supplies and other urgent Russian assistance and loans for Syria, whose economy has been crippled by the conflict, but said he had failed to secure a final pledge from Moscow.

The comment appears to betray a growing impatience by Russia to achieve some sort of progress toward peace talks in the face of the escalating violence and little sign of concessions from Assad.

The Syrian Observatory said 198 people were killed on Tuesday, including dozens who were summarily executed or slain in an attack on a funeral procession by troops who raided the Damascus suburb of Maadamiyat al-Sham.

It is impossible to verify the claims.

Heavy shelling was reported across many parts of Aleppo on Tuesday, including an area where a Japanese reporter was killed Monday, becoming the fourth foreign journalist killed in the conflict.

At least 31 civilians, including five women and five children, were killed there on Tuesday alone, the Observatory said.

A top FSA commander, Colonel Abdel Jabbar al-Okaidi, said the rebels now controlled 60 percent of the now battered manufacturing hub that was largely spared the conflict until fierce fighting erupted there a month ago.

“The people are with us,” he said. “How else do you think we could have lasted a month?

But a security source in Damascus dismissed the claims as “completely false”, saying the army was making slow progress in what the regime has warned would be a “mother of all battles” to retake the city.

“Reinforcements from both sides are heading to Aleppo. It is a war that will last a long time,” he said.

The relentless fighting has triggered a mass refugee exodus and left another 2.5 million in need of aid inside the country, creating what US State Department officials said was one of the worst crises in the world today.

The conflict spilled over again into neighbouring Lebanon, with six dead in clashes that first erupted late Monday between pro- and anti-Damascus regime supporters in the northern port city of Tripoli, security officials said.

#Syrian forces kill at least 31 in Damascus raids

22/08/12

The attacks may have been designed to kill or capture rebel mortar teams who have used the two neighborhoods in recent days to target the city’s Mazzeh military airport, activists said.

The violence is part of a dramatic surge in fighting over the past month in Damascus, which is just one of many fronts President Bashar Assad’s regime is struggling to contain as the rebellion against his rule gains strength. Government forces are also engaged in a major battle for control of the northern city of Aleppo as well as smaller scale operations in the south, east and central regions.

An activist, who only wanted to be identified by the name Bassam for fear of retribution, said 11 people were killed in Kafar Soussa and that as many as 22 tanks stormed the district with about 20 soldiers on foot behind each one. He spoke via Skype from central Damascus.

The British-based activist group Syrian Observatory for Human Rights put the death toll in Kafar Soussa at 12.

Bassam and the observatory also reported heavy government shelling of Nahr Eishah early Wednesday. They said regime forces then conducted house-to-house raids in search of rebels. Bassam said as many as 12 people were killed in Nahr Eishah, while the observatory had no word on casualties.

It was not clear whether those killed in the two areas died in the shelling or later. Other activists, including one reached by Skype in Kafar Soussa, spoke of execution-style killings in both areas.

The activists’ reports could not be independently verified.

Syria’s ongoing civil war has its roots in a mostly peaceful uprising against Assad’s regime that began in March last year. The uprising grew increasingly violent as the regime employed brutal methods to suppress street protests, including the use of live ammunition and the detention and torture of thousands.

The conflict has to date defied all international efforts to end it.

#Syria’s children are adapting to the violence

15/08/12

Serene Assir, AFP
Last updated: August 15, 2012

Turning rockets into goal posts, abandoned tanks into playthings, and war into a game, children in Syria are hostages to a conflict that has forced them to try to normalise death, loss and violence, residents and activists say.

In rebel-held but besieged Old City of Homs, in central Syria, young children play Free Syrian Army versus Assad regime, using okra for ammunition and aubergines for hand grenades.

Football lovers in the city, parts of which are shelled almost daily, take rockets and turn them into goalposts, according to activists’ photographs.

Speaking to AFP from Homs via Skype, Umm Mohammed says her five grandchildren — the eldest of whom is just nine — are not afraid of the sound of shelling or bullets, and that shrapnel has become just another toy for them.

“But at night, they sometimes wake up screaming,” lamented Umm Mohammed. “No child should see what they are seeing, and they have already seen so much.”

Some older children have it even worse. In northern Aleppo, scene of heavy violence since July 20, an AFP reporter saw several boys in their teens armed with Kalashnikovs, taking part in the fighting.

According to the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, more than 1,300 children have been killed in violence in the past 17 months.

Nor are children exempt from detention. According to the Centre for Documentation of Violations in Syria, as of August 14, 698 children have been detained since the outbreak of the anti-regime uprising.

On Tuesday, Syria’s main opposition coalition said a 14-year-old was tortured to death in a prison in the coastal province of Latakia.

“Children are hostages of the violence,” said Omar, a Hama-based activist and uncle of two. “They did nothing to create it, but they are trapped in it.”

Having suffered violence, directly or indirectly, children develop high levels of resilience, experts say, which at once acts as a psychological shield against horror, and at the same time allows them to accept the abnormal as normal.

“My nephew is a seven-year-old child who acts like a man,” Omar told AFP via Skype. Wanted by the authorities, Omar sends his nephew out to tour the neighbourhood and check whether there are military or security forces nearby. “As an uncle, I am sad he has lost his childhood.”

Such examples may be extreme, but they do provide some insight into the way that conflict in Syria has transformed children’s lives, forcing them to adapt to violence, and in many cases, become immersed in it.

“Death has become all too normal for many children,” says Beirut-based psychologist Lina Issa, who works with Syrian refugees in Lebanon, a country that has itself suffered years of war and violence.

“And as much as children are being raised as the heroes of one side or another, that is not a way for children to grow. They need the situation to change.”

Children may be more resilient, Issa said. “But it will take a long time for the real symptoms of their distress to show. Only when stability returns will we know the real psychological cost of this conflict,” she added.

Different children react in different ways to violence, said Issa. “I have seen some young children who should have started walking or talking, but haven’t,” she said.

“Others become defensive, and pretend like nothing is really happening,” she says, noting that some children draw only hearts and flowers, while others’ artwork focuses on violence and conflict.

Indeed, a dramatic amateur video posted by activists on YouTube shows a young wounded girl crying in her father’s arms in Aleppo, as a doctor puts his hand to her back. She has just been wounded by a bullet, but she cries: “I am fine! I am fine!”

Many Syrian children have grown all too accustomed to feeling unsafe, says Isabella Castrogiovanni, a child protection expert at UNICEF Lebanon.

A recent UNICEF survey of Syrian refugee families in Lebanon showed 54 percent of children felt something bad will happen, even after they found shelter outside Syria.

“One child in a UNICEF child-friendly space in Lebanon panics every time he sees someone walking on a rooftop, because he is scared of snipers,” adds Castrogiovanni, who notes how disruptive forced flight is to a child’s development.

Even in the most tragic circumstances, some children manage to retain hope. In Homs Old City, seven-year-old Maryam (not her real name) told AFP via Skype: “When I grow up, I want to become a doctor, so that I can help the injured.”

Twice displaced, Maryam, a granddaughter of Umm Mohammed, does not recognise she is besieged, nor does she say that her family was forced to flee their home in Bab Dreib.

To Maryam, home is her current shelter. “I live at home, with my family. We are fine.”

Others are less positive, and their imagination is a mirror-image of the daily loss of life in Syria. “One child tells me stories every day, as part of his therapy,” says Issa. “His storyline changes, but the ending is always the same.”

In this child’s world, whatever the outcome in Syria, she says, “everybody dies.”

© AFP 2012

Why has the Saudi king invited Ahmadinejad to the #Syria summit?

07/08/2012

A diplomatic resolution looks unlikely in Syria, but in the realm of Saudi politics, a personal invitation from the king is symbolically important

Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been invited by the Saudi king to attend a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Photograph: Behrouz Mehri/AFP/Getty Images


The visit of the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to Saudi Arabia comes at a crucial time for the conflict in Syria. Few observers can be optimistic about the chances for diplomacy, with the Annan plan abandoned and the quieter efforts at reaching a US-Russia deal stalled.

Most analysts predict that Syria’s uprising against dictatorship – which began as a peaceful cross-sectarian movement calling for basic freedoms – will increasingly mutate into a sectarian civil war. Much of the western policy debate is moving on to the risks of prolonged state failure in a post-Assad future.

Within the Arab world, the debate over Syria is increasingly becoming polarised along ideological and sectarian lines, as the country’s strategic importance to the region’s great powers seems to be obscuring the commonalities between the basic demands of the Syrian protesters and their counterparts in other Arab countries. Any efforts to draw back from the brink – and to stop the Syrian uprising against dictatorship being derailed by a sectarian regional proxy war – deserve attention.

Ahmadinejad’s visit, which an aide has said will go ahead, is a rare one. He last visited Saudi Arabia in 2007, at a time when the Gulf states were trying so hard to reach out to Iran that Qatar even invited him to join in the annual summit of the Gulf Co-operation Council (the regional organisation representing the six Gulf Arab monarchies, which was founded in 1981 partly in response to the perceived threat of the Iranian revolution).

Although there is a long history of rivalry and competition between the Gulf Arab countries and Iran, relations have not always been so conflicted. Back in 2008, Ahmadinejad visited Bahrain and signed an agreement for Iran to supply Bahrain with natural gas. The deal, which seems almost unthinkable today, never materialised.

By contrast, Ahmadinejad’s most recent foray to the other side of the Gulf was in April, when he toured Abu Musa, an island occupied by Iran but claimed by the UAE. This prompted fury in the Gulf monarchies, where rulers saw it as a sign of Iranian expansionist tendencies, and were frustrated by the lack of reaction from their western allies (who were preparing for talks with Iran over the nuclear issue and who are not deeply engaged on the islands issue).

It is in Syria that the Saudi-Iranian confrontation has become the most pronounced and dangerous, but the two are competing for influence in the wider region. They back rival camps in Iraq, Lebanon, and to some extent Yemen and the Palestinian territories (though Hamas has always had some support in the Gulf and is now distancing itself from both Iran and Syria). They are also at odds over the treatment of Shia protesters in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s own eastern province. Saudi officials routinely suggest that Iran is fomenting the protests in both cases.

For its part, Iran’s interests seem to be best served by giving only moral support to the protesters, so it can sit back and watch its rivals challenged from within, without the kind of direct involvement that could spark retaliation.

Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are effective exploiters of “soft power”, making use of their various media channels and religious networks to try to discredit the other.

One of the disadvantages of this approach is that it is never quite clear how centralised the control of foreign policy really is. Another problem is that the Middle Eastern media are becoming increasingly sectarian – a trend that is worrying many people in the ethnically and religiously diverse countries of the Gulf.

Now, with the collapse of Kofi Annan’s mission to Syria, the Gulf Arab monarchies are becoming more open about their support for the Syrian opposition, including the armed Free Syrian Army. Saudi Arabia has hosted a variety of Syrian opposition visitors, from members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to Assad’s estranged uncle, Rifaat al-Assad and Manaf Tlass, a senior Syrian military officer who defected just a few weeks ago.

The latter visitors illustrate that Saudi Arabia is not only supporting the Islamist opposition; it has its own concerns about the rising regional influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose focus on electoral politics represents a major challenge to the Saudi model of partnership between clerics and hereditary rulers.

The UAE is also pursuing a delicate balancing act, as it is home to a number of Syrian National Council activists – who recently announced the defection of the Syrian ambassador to the UAE – but is extremely wary of the role the Muslim Brotherhood could play in its own territory, and is investigating around 50 imprisoned Islamist political activists who are accused of conspiring with foreign organisations.

Even before the Annan mission collapsed, the Saudi and UAE foreign ministers were expressing extreme frustration with what they see as international inaction over Syria. Saudi Arabia has never seemed particularly convinced by western diplomatic efforts; Kofi Annan did not visit Riyadh during his Syria mediation efforts, and neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran was included in the last “Friends of Syria” meeting.

Most indications point to further conflict rather than a diplomatic resolution. But in the highly personalised realm of Saudi politics, a personal invitation from the king is symbolically important.

In Lebanon, in 2008 and 2009, the confrontation between the Saudi-backed 14 March alliance and the Iranian-backed 8 March alliance occasionally looked like it could lead to renewed civil conflict. But there, the rival factions stepped back from the brink, negotiating power-sharing agreements before and after the 2009 elections.

This would be far harder to achieve in Syria, with its daily bloodshed and its asymmetry of forces, but the cost of conflict is high enough for any remaining diplomatic options to be worth exploring.

#Syria Conflict: How Much Longer Will Assad Last?
David Arnold
Street demonstrations to bring an end to the Assad family’s 42-year rule over Syria have turned into a bloody conflict, now in its 15th month, between one of the Middle East’s best-equipped fighting forces and a growing insurgency of protesters and militia largely comprised of government soldiers who defected in support of the armed rebellion. How much longer this conflict – and President Bashar al-Assad as its apparent cause -  will last is a question pondered by many today, but not easily answered. 

The success of the rebels’ guerilla tactics against Assad’s larger and more formidable military and security forces have surprised many experts. Observers following recent advances by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other rebel militias have discovered new leadership among these disparate fighting units. Given the situation on the ground, they wonder not only who will win, but how long the conflict will last.

“If you look at the battlefield, Bashar [al-Assad] is not president of all of Syria anymore, because he has lost control of so much of Syria, even his own suburbs,” said Ken Katzman, a Middle East Affairs specialist with the Congressional Research Service, in an interview this week with alHurra TV.

“Even without foreign intervention, these rebels are making significant progress,” said Katzman. He cautioned, however, that he does not believe that FSA units are “about to march on the presidential palace.”

The rebels’ success is not assured, but even if they did win, some say Syria would suffer a power vacuum and be entrenched in internal strife for years to come.

“Any expectation of a short-term outcome, for example, an escalation with Turkey or the Assad regime being somehow magically whisked away through force or a political outcome doesn’t change the reality of the underlying social, economic political and communal pressures…” said Aram Nerguizian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,

A diplomatic solution to Syria’s crisis may be remote. It remains to be seen if Assad, who has all but ignored a six-point peace plan put forward by joint U.N.-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan, will honor his latest commitment to end the violence less than three weeks before the mandate of 300 U.N. monitors in Syria is set to expire. Even Russia agreeing recently in Geneva to an Action Group for Syria road maptoward the formation of a “transition government” in which Assad would play a role offers no end to the fighting as Syrian opposition leaders have unanimously rejected the agreement.

The first 15 months of the conflict, according to some sources, have resulted in more than 16,000 deaths – mostly civilians. Thousands more have been detained and tortured, according to a Human Rights Watch investigationreleased July 3. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports an average of a 100 killings in Syria per day.

Rebel military councils dominate in crucial rural areas

Military offensives on both sides are changing the strategic landscape of Syria daily. The government’s heavy weapons have destroyed rebel-held neighborhoods in at least a half dozen cities with rebel forces fading into the countryside only to return and attempting to reclaim positions lost.

Joseph Holliday, author of ”Syria’s Maturing Insurgency,” a report released in mid-June by the Institute for the Study of War, writes that the Assad regime “retains the capacity to clear whatever it chooses through the use of overwhelming firepower” but did little in the first year of the conflict to try to capture and hold several urban rebel strongholds. In major engagements over the past few weeks, Assad’s security forces have retaken three urban centers – Idlib, Homs and Zabadani – and established large military garrisons for their defense. However, Holliday added that the regime does not have the forces necessary to pursue rebel divisions that now prosper in the countryside.

“Neither side has the strength to defeat the other,” Holliday writes.

Holliday’s report provides a graphic look at the positions of rebel forces listing political and military structures of the opposition inside Syria, as well as the names of leaders and battalion strengths of military councils in Homs, Hama, Deraa and Idlib. A map identifies enclaves in rural areas within striking distance of all major cities along the Route M5 corridor that links all major inland population centers along a western corridor from Lebanon to Turkey, including Damascus, the capital, and the major commercial city of Aleppo.

Nerguizian said the Holliday report “is accurate to the point that you have an Assad regime which has largely failed in implementing a security response over the early months of 2012.” The regime tried to retake the rebel-held rural areas around Aleppo and Idlib, but “those have been largely unsuccessful efforts so far,” he said.

Many of the government advances were “short-term successes” in cities closer to Damascus such as Hama and Homs, Neeguizian said. He pointed to sizeable pockets of rebel autonomy in Idlib and on the Lebanese frontier that “reflect a decision by the Assad regime that it’s far more important to maintain support and over-watch in Damascus and… Aleppo.”

Riad Khawaji of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis in Dubai believes the Holliday report is “a bit out-dated.”

“Most of the rural areas and especially the major urban centers of Idlib and Aleppo in the north are now under the control of the rebels,” Khawaji said. He added he had seen reports that FSA forces had taken control of two Syrian military airfields. Khawaji said Turkish jets that were scrambled recently along the Syrian border to prevent another downing of a Turkish jet by Syria have, in effect, created a no-fly zone that gives the rebels air cover for their advances in the north.

Looking for new leadership in Syria

“An alternative source of authority and security in Syria may be emerging,” writes Josh Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma and author of the Syria Comment blog. Following the Geneva agreement of last weekend, Landis speculates that, in time, the militias of the FSA that can effectively cooperate with the revolutionary councils and can deliver field successes “will rise to the top, pulling the smaller brigades into their ranks.”

Experts attribute the successes of the FSA and its array of militias to several factors: growing popular support among majority Sunnis who see no government reforms coming from Damascus; increasing defections from Assad’s forces to the anti-government militias; a government and national economy weakened by global sanctions; and increasing FSA access to better weapons and communications systems smuggled across the Turkish and Lebanese borders.

Despite the early summer stalemate, the regime refuses to order many battalions into action to reduce defections by predominantly Sunni divisions, said Khawaji. Instead, it seems to rely on four Alawite divisions of known loyalists, supplemented by intelligence services and non-uniformed militia knows as the shabiha.

“Today they are over-stretched and they focus on Damascus,” Khawaji said.

Provincial military councils of the FSA have also coordinated closely with the three major organizations of the civilian opposition within Syria, said Elizabeth O’Bagy of the Institute for the Study of War. In addition to staging the protests that sparked the revolution, revolutionary councils organized a number of general strikes in several cities. In her “Syria’s Political Struggle: Spring 2012” backgrounder,” O’Bagy describes a three-week commercial strike in May in Hamadiya, the major marketplace in central Damascus where 70 percent of the shops shut down.

“Even after government forces ordered the shops to open, about 50 percent of them remained shut” for the entire three-week period, O’Bagy said.

O’Bagy said rebels have created alternative civic institutions in areas they control. In the Homs and Idlib countrysides under militia control, she said, “they are training teachers for the upcoming school year, opening medical services, food and aid distribution, sending representatives to Turkey and Lebanon to solicit aid.”

Experts believe that cooperation between protesters and the FSA militias may eventually produce a new type of Syrian political leadership, one more promising than the mostly expatriate Syrian National Council which seems unable to garner the support of rebel forces and the political opposition inside the country.

Signs of strength within FSA forces and the revolutionary councils that drive the revolution do not, however, assure an end to the conflict any time soon. And a possible alternative political structure coming either from a power-sharing agreement crafted by the Action Group for Syria, or competition for power from within a successful rebel leadership would also not promise a quick end to the crisis either, experts say.

“We don’t talk in terms of an Arab Spring in Syria, anyway,” said Nerguizian. “It was always going to be a decade.”

UN mission in #Syria to stay suspended

UNITED NATIONS — The United Nations mission in Syria will remain suspended because the conflict between government and opposition forces is intensifying, a top UN official told the UN Security Council on Tuesday.

And UN-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan has still not secured agreement on a political transition plan that all the major powers can back so that an international meeting on the conflict can go ahead this week, diplomats said.

Herve Ladsous, UN peacekeeping chief, said civilians in Syria face “increasing danger” and “conditions are not conducive to resume operations,” diplomats at a closed Security Council meeting on the conflict said.

The almost 300 unarmed UN monitors halted operations on June 16 as President Bashar al-Assad’s crackdown against opposition groups intensified.

Ladsous said the UN mission was still trying to help humanitarian workers. But he added that the Syrian government was throwing up obstacles such as refusing to allow satellite telephones, which the UN official said were “key tools.”

The UN is working on options for the mission when its mandate ends on July 20. Diplomats expect the mission to be cut back to a mainly civilian operation.

Annan’s deputy envoy, Nasser al-Qudwa, told the council there were “massive” rights violations in Syria with more civilians being killed each day and growing attacks on government forces by opposition fighters, the diplomats reported.

With Syrian activists now estimating more than 15,000 people have died in the 15-month old conflict, France demanded at the meeting that UN rights chief Navi Pillay brief the Security Council on Syria to keep up pressure on Assad.

Qudwa said foreign ministers from the major powers and other key countries around Syria could meet in Geneva on Saturday to discuss political efforts to implement Annan’s floundering six-point peace plan.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has accepted an invitation to Saturday’s Geneva meeting, the country’s UN envoy said. But diplomats added there is not yet an accord on a political plan so that Annan can officially convene the meeting.

“We attach great importance to this meeting. As you know Russia proposed an international conference on Syria and this is very much in line with our thinking,” Russia’s UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin told reporters.

Because of the “grim” situation in Syria “we need to work even harder,” he added. Russia wanted the Geneva meeting to “provide a powerful impetus for political efforts to put an end to the conflict in Syria.”

The United States, Britain, France and China — the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council — have not yet said whether they will attend the Geneva meeting.

The main powers have been in intensive consultations in recent days on a political plan for Syria that would tempt Assad into talks on his future.

Qudwa said the Geneva meeting should identify measures to secure implementation of Annan’s peace plan and agree on guidelines for a political transition.

Because of the growing death toll, the Geneva meeting must not be a “talking shop” which is why the key states must agree on the guidelines, Qudwa was quoted as saying.

He added that a decision on whether to hold the meeting depended on “agreement on the scope of participation and an intention to reach an outcome,” Council diplomats said.

Annan has said he wants key states that can influence Syria, as well as the main powers, at the Geneva meeting. Annan and UN leader Ban Ki-moon have both spoken in favor of Iran taking part. The United States opposes Iranian involvement.

Bracing for an Uncertain Future in #Syria

By Aram Nerguizian

JUN 20, 2012

As former UN secretary general Kofi Annan’s peace plan struggles to make headway, there are few good options to deal with what are likely to be years of unrest and socioeconomic and political instability. The Annan plan called for a Syrian-led political process under UN supervision to bring about a cessation of armed violence across the country. It also called for dialogue between opposition forces and the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Neither the regime nor opposition forces have truly pushed for a verifiable cessation of hostilities.

On the sidelines of the G20 summit in Mexico, U.S. president Barack Obama and Russian president Vladimir Putin agreed that there was still an urgent need for a diplomatic solution to the crisis and a true commitment to put an end to the violence on the ground. While the growing humanitarian cost of the crisis is tragic, it is only one part of what has been shaping up to be an intractable struggle for power. All of the alternatives to Annan’s plan—from arming opposition forces to U.S.-led armed intervention—would create more problems than they would solve, running the risk of a disastrous backfire. Accordingly, there is a need for a realistic assessment of the scale of local, regional, and international competition over Syria, as well as the possible trajectories the Syrian crisis may take.

Syria’s Continuing Downward Spiral

More than a year of upheaval has cost thousands of Syrian lives in the face of a brutal government crackdown. The Assad regime squandered several opportunities for reform to settle the crisis, and it did little to address the socioeconomic and political grievances of protestors in a country that has struggled with supporting the interests of its corporatist ruling elite, while trying to liberalize a fragile national economy.

Unlike past Arab League–sponsored efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis, Annan’s joint UN and Arab League initiative enjoys the support of the entire Security Council—including Russia and China, who remain deeply averse to intervention in Syria. The Annan plan also avoids calls for Assad to relinquish power and instead highlights the need for dialogue between the regime and opposition forces. Unfortunately, the Assad regime has done little to bolster the Annan plan’s chances for success. Instead it has pursued a security response that, while effective at undermining the armed opposition, has done nothing to roll back and address the cumulative effects of more than a year of protests and calls for regime change.

Meanwhile, opposition forces inside and outside Syria remain divided about how to end the crisis and whether or not to engage the regime. The Syrian National Council (SNC) and the armed militias operating under the loose auspices of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) have rejected any kind of dialogue with Assad amid growing calls for a military solution. Other groups, including the Syria-based National Coordinating Council (NCC), are more flexible. That the militarization of anti-regime forces has come at the expense of more moderate opposition forces also serves to make the task more daunting. More militant and Islamist forces are playing an increasingly critical yet uncertain role in the crisis. Meanwhile, persistent divisions continue to complicate any effort that hopes to defuse the crisis through dialogue.

Escalating measures undertaken by both the regime and its opponents have done little to dampen the crisis in Syria. On the one hand, the Assad regime’s response to both the opposition and the Annan plan is consistent with the “lessons learned” from authoritarian failures in other regional states, such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. On the other hand, Syria’s internal and external opposition forces have learned some analogous lessons—both good and bad—from the successes and failures of counter-regime forces across the region. However, they have also increasingly turned to an armed insurgency targeting the security apparatus and regime institutions while digging in to oust Assad. Despite both pro- and anti-regime forces’ hardening positions, neither the regime nor its opponents are likely to bring an end to the crisis in the short term.

Mapping Regional Competition over Syria

While Syria’s internal unrest is rooted in underlying socioeconomics, political representation, governance, and other pressures, the crisis has not evolved in a vacuum, and it increasingly reflects the interests of competing regional actors willing to support competing factions in Syria.

At the regional level, the Syrian crisis remains sensitive to competition between the predominantly Sunni Gulf monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Shi’a Iran. The GCC—led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar—is currently providing financial and military support to mostly Sunni opposition forces inside Syria. This is driven by a desire to weaken the Assad regime, Iran’s sole Arab state partner and a key way station for Iranian support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Another factor is appeasing populations that increasingly see events in Syria through the lens of Sunni-Shi’a regional competition. A third factor is a unique opportunity to shape the regional balance of power at a time when the three traditional pillars of inter-Arab politics—Egypt, Iraq, and Syria—are either unstable or unable to shape regional events.

Increased levels of involvement in Syria’s internal dynamics are not unique to the Gulf states. For Iran, the risks of not tackling Syrian instability could include at least a partial loss of its ability to influence the Arab-Israeli conflict or to provide support via Syria to militant Palestinians and Iran’s Shi’a allies in Lebanon. Iran is providing assistance to the Assad regime as it tries to suppress an insurgency that is enjoying growing levels of external support.

Israel and Turkey also have an interest in how events in Syria unfold. Syria under Ba’ath rule has been a largely predictable factor in Israel’s national security calculus; many in Israel continue to doubt the prospects for a stable transition and view change in Syria as the latest chapter of an increasingly negative cycle of regional unrest. Meanwhile, there is no basis on which to make the argument that a post-Assad Syria will be politically stable, make peace with Israel, renounce claims to the Golan Heights, or stop providing assistance to militant Palestinian elements or Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Where Israel has done little beyond expressing growing concern at the risks of Syrian instability, Turkey has become one of the Assad regime’s core regional opponents and home to both peaceful and armed opposition to the ruling Alawite-led regime. One reason for Turkey’s policy shift is strong Arab and predominantly Sunni views surrounding events in Syria. Another is to try to pivot Turkey at a time when its foreign policy appears to have gone from “zero problems” to “problems on every border.” While Turkey has been reluctant to escalate too far beyond rhetoric due to its own internal pressures from political opposition groups and the country’s ethnic minorities, there is anecdotal evidence that an important portion of logistical, military, and financial support to the insurgency continues to cross Turkey’s southern border with Syria.

Mapping International Competition over Syria

A similarly complex web of interests in Syria exists at the international level. For the United State, a growing insurgency in Syria and the potential for an end to Ba’ath rule seem to hold the promise of achieving the core foreign policy outcomes that all of the competing schools of U.S. policy toward Syria aspire to achieve: breaking the three-decade-old Iran-Syria axis and denying Tehran the means to project power and influence in the Levant. However, protests and instability with no clear end state in Syria and no clear alternative to Assad to ensure stability do little to satisfy U.S. efforts to safeguard regional stability. European states, led by France and the United Kingdom, also hold out hope that change in Damascus can lead to change in the balance of power in the Levant. Whereas the United States has until recently been reluctant to give Syrian opposition groups more than rhetorical support, European states have at times been among the most critical of Assad and keen to support opposition forces in the country.

At the other end of the international spectrum, Russia and China have signaled that intervention in Syria is a foreign policy red line. Russian interests are driven by a need to balance against the United States and the West in a region where Moscow faces declining influence. Another factor is Russia’s intent to secure the viability of a key regional ally that provides Moscow with the potential to project naval power and foreign policy influence in the Mediterranean. China has similar concerns regarding competition with the United States, as well as a desire to avoid setting international precedents that could be a source of instability at home. Together, Russia and China have and are likely to continue blocking any international action that leaves openings for intervention such as that seen in Libya. Unlike China, however, Russia is far more actively engaged in buttressing the Assad regime, potentially through continued arms and technology transfers. Further binding action on Syria will be difficult without taking into account Russia’s foreign policy interests.

The Effects of Competition on Resolving the Conflict

With regional and international actors supporting competing local forces vying for power in Syria, the pace and scale of external involvement serve to complicate efforts like the Annan plan to bring events in Syria under control.

While the Annan plan remains one of the best options for a diplomatic solution in Syria, it is a strategy that has been struggling to gain real traction. Pro- and anti-Assad forces in and outside of Syria were slow to support it, let alone actively endorse it. This is partly due to the “winner take all” approach of Syria’s competing political forces, forces that refuse to make any concessions for fear of showing weakness. The peace effort also remains at the mercy of regional and international competition. How much pressure the Assad regime and its opponents feel to abide by the Annan plan reflects, at least in part, the extent to which their warring external patrons are willing to push for a resolution. So far, regional and international actors on either side of the divide have yet to put their full weight behind the Annan plan.

Another key effect of regional and international competition has been to further polarize an already divided international community when it comes to Syria. An example of this is the Friends of Syria conference that took place in parallel to the announcement of the Annan plan in February 2012. While the Annan plan was viewed by Syria’s competing forces as an uneasy and potentially painful compromise for peace, the Friends of Syria conference was far more supportive of outright regime change and offered few incentives for Assad or his external allies to engage the forum seriously. In particular Russia, China, and Iran elected not to take part due to the perception that the group was created at least partially to discuss ways to provide financial and military support to the Syrian opposition.

A further example of an effort to resolve the conflict that may divide more than unite is the Syria contact group currently being proposed by Russia with the support of Kofi Annan himself. Given successive calls for Assad’s ouster, Russia finds itself in a unique position in terms of continued direct access to the Ba’ath ruling structure in Damascus, access that it hopes to leverage to bolster its regional role and to ensure continuity in Russia’s bid to maintain access to the Mediterranean. Where the Friends of Syria group earned the scorn of Assad’s backers, the Syria contact group may elicit strong opposition from the United States and other Western nations because of the possibility that Iran may be invited to take part as one of a number of countries with influence in Syria.

If there is a lesson from the past, it is that all the competing outside powers need to be extremely cautious about the assumption that they can change the regime in Syria in any predictable or stable way, given that it is a nation with no coherent opposition and no practical democratic experience. For better or worse, actors that include China, the European Union, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United States have enormous influence in shaping the trajectory of events in Syria. However, no single player or select group of players is likely to determine a stable final outcome.

Scenarios for a Volatile Future

Despite these enormous complexities, there continues to be a heated debate about whether or not direct military intervention in Syria is avoidable. What is likely is that Syria will experience deep instability for years to come, regardless of whether or not Assad stays in power and irrespective of any potential external intervention. Accordingly, there is a need to map out the potential trajectories the Syria crisis may take, trajectories that can impact or be impacted by the strategies of competing local actors and their regional and international allies.

The first scenario would center on the institutionalization of sectarian politics in Syria through a loose confederal power-sharing arrangement. Prior to instability in 2011 and 2012, Syrians prided themselves on being above the communal politics of their similarly diverse post-Ottoman neighbors, Lebanon and Iraq. However, more than a year of bloody unrest coupled with deepening sectarian dividing lines make it highly unlikely that Syria’s Sunni majority will accept going back to a power structure that institutionalizes de facto Alawite control. By the same token, Syria’s Alawites and other minority groups will refuse to give up power in ways that would relegate them once more to the bottom of the political food chain in Syria. Agreeing on a communal power-sharing model may be one answer to stave off long-term communal conflict, but history and similar experiences in Lebanon and Iraq point to the complexities and inherent instability of institutionalizing sectarianism. What is certain is that such an outcome has a low probability of success in the absence of strong internal, regional, and international support.

A second scenario Syria might face is protracted civil war. Not unlike the decade-long conflict in Algeria, the Assad regime may find the means to sustain military superiority over the insurgency. But that will do little to either address underlying popular grievances or prevent the opposition from metastasizing further as the crisis persists. External actors such as Russia and Iran—but also potentially Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other nations—are likely to provide more financial and military support to their respective clients in Syria. There is no clear end state for this model. One side may ultimately win, but a more likely outcome is the further decaying of political and civil life in a country with only limited experience in terms of postindependence politics and institution building, as was the case in Algeria and Lebanon.

A third scenario for Syria would entail communal separation or outright secession by the ruling Alawite sect. So far, the Syrian opposition has failed to present a true challenge to the Assad regime’s ability to maintain relative control over the country. However, should Assad fail to hold onto large swaths of Syrian territory or effective command and control—perhaps as a result of military intervention—his Alawite sect, as well as other smaller communities, may opt to consolidate their position in parts of the country they can hold on to effectively, specifically the Mediterranean coastline and the community’s ancestral towns and villages in the Nusayri mountains in the northwest of the country. Independence for Kosovo in 2008 and South Sudan in 2011 set important precedents for self-determination in the twenty-first century. Syria’s Alawites have experienced autonomy—albeit short-lived—during the 1920s under the French mandate. Another driver toward autonomy may be what happens to minorities when they lose power in the Levant, specifically the recent loss of Sunni control in Iraq and the downgrading of the Christian Maronite community in postwar Lebanon. Unlike in those countries, Syria’s military remains largely Alawite dominated and could serve as a bulwark to defend discrete communal interests. This model also presents significant challenges, not the least of which would be the prospects of ethnic cleansing in Syria and the potential creation of a landlocked and resource-poor rump state with a large Sunni population.

None of these scenarios is optimal or stable. However, that these are the three most realistic outcomes is a testament to the scale of the tragedy of Syria. The crisis has gone well beyond simple notions of good and evil tied to Assad’s brutal rule. The postcolonial Syrian national experiment is coming apart, and there is very little anyone can do to reverse the process. Short of letting events play out through a cycle of violence or intervening without a solution to stabilize the future, external forces may have little choice but to pursue strategies that address Syria’s increasingly communal politics. The alternatives could be civil conflict and cantonization.

Syrian Wildcards

Beyond potential scenarios for Syria’s future, there are key wildcards that affect the calculus of external actors and how the crisis may or may not deepen in unpredictable ways.

Syria has among the most extensive holdings of chemical weapons in the Middle East. Many have expressed concern that these weapons could somehow end up in the hands of nonstate actors that are hostile to the United States, Israel, and other regional allies. Given the current balance of power between the Syrian Armed Forces and the insurgents, military intervention could be the only way to shift the internal balance of power in Syria away from Assad in the short term. However, intervention could also degrade and break down the Syrian military in ways that could undermine current safeguards on Syria’s chemical weapons holdings. The same uncertainties largely hold true of Syria’s extensive holdings of man-portable surface-to-air missiles (MANPADs), ship- and shore-mounted antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and its extensive holdings of short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

Another dimension that matters is Syria’s effects on regional stability. Like Iraq, instability and change in Syria would have significant consequences for the regional balance of power in the Levant and the stability of states like Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Northern Lebanon has become especially unstable, with potential implications for national stability and calm along the UN line of demarcation with Israel. Meanwhile, King Abdullah of Jordan—a country that can scarcely avoid pressure from Syrian instability—has become the latest regional leader to warn in an interview with Al Hayat that intervening militarily in Syria would risk the “total breakdown in regional security.”

Beyond the immediate Levant, there are real risks for key U.S. allies in the GCC. Providing increasing levels of financial and military support to the Syrian opposition risks far more dangerous and less predictable Syrian and Iranian responses should Iran elect to confront the GCC states in the Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz. So far, Iran has avoided targeting GCC states directly, but that could change if the crisis surrounding Syria deepens further.

Tactical versus strategic approaches to Syria are another important wildcard. The former has defined far too much of the Gulf approach to the Syrian crisis with only limited focus on mapping out a more sustainable and stable future. This is driven at least in part by the conviction that so long as Assad is out of power, whatever emerges next is likely to be Sunni dominated with the potential to be co-opted along communal lines. By contrast, while the U.S. policy community continues to debate the pros and cons of deeper involvement in Syria, the broader U.S. approach remains far more focused on trying to secure a viable strategic outcome that promotes regional stability, as opposed to the promises of short-term tactical gains in Damascus.

No Good Options for Syria’s “Arab Decade”

No amount of repression will reverse the fractures in Syrian society. Moreover, migrations, lasting memories of violence, national economic decline, and isolation will all challenge any regime in Damascus for years to come, as will the hostility of neighboring Sunni Arab states—a problem that Syria’s increasingly sectarian crisis is scarcely going to ease.

Instability in Syria is also a problem that will not go away with the departure of Assad and his inner circle or through military intervention. The underlying grievances tied to economic performance, opportunities for socioeconomic advancement, and hopes for better governance are such that any regime in Damascus will have to come to terms with the fact that Syria faces years, if not decades, of instability.

While some of the internal, regional, and international dynamics in Syria can be isolated, the crisis in Syria remains closely linked to Western and Arab Gulf competition with Iran. Beyond the regional balance of power is the reality that a deepening crisis in Syria straddles broader regional Sunni-Shi’a fault lines, as well as the Kurdish issue and the full range of sectarian tensions in Lebanon and Iraq. Syria is central now to all these divisions, which have grown to be nearly intractable and pose real challenges for a Middle East caught in a cycle of spiraling conflict.

As none of the paths to a diplomatic solution in Syria are either easy or optimal to all players at once, a UN-brokered peace process that enjoys the broadest possible level of internal and external support continues to be the best available option in the face of heightening violence and instability.

Saudis Seek to Funnel Arms to #Syria Rebels

Gulf Kingdom Is Pressing Jordan for a Route to Border, Officials Say; Iraq Warns of ‘Regional and Global Proxy Wars’

Saudi Arabia has pressed Jordan to open its border with Syria to allow weapons to reach rebels fighting President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, officials from both countries say, a move that could buoy Syria’s opposition and harden the conflict in the country and across the region.

In a March 12 meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah asked his Jordanian counterpart to permit weapons shipments into Syria in exchange for economic assistance to Jordan, these officials say. Jordan hasn’t yet agreed, they said.

The U.S. has opposed furnishing arms to the rebels, fearing that weapons could end up in the hands of al Qaeda or other extremist groups. But late Thursday, a top U.S. defense official suggested such a policy could potentially shift. Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the U.S. military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the Syrian opposition appeared to be taking steps to unite as a group, a development he said could help clear the way for international aid including arms.

Syrians living in Jordan demonstrate against President Assad on March 23. Sunnis account for much of Syria’s opposition and are the majority population of Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Such international support, he said, may hinge on assurances from a “coherent, credible” opposition that it would form an inclusive government and not fan sectarian flames. But some fear arming the opposition could escalate prospects for a broader regional conflict. Syria’s fighting has already added to the rancor between Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies, who support the country’s largely Sunni opposition, and Shiite Iran, whose government backs Mr. Assad.

Saudi Arabia has argued strongly for weapons supplies to Syrian rebels despite U.S. concerns. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was traveling Thursday to Saudi Arabia to meet with the king and other senior Saudi officials, was expected to raise any Saudi plans to arm the Syrian rebels, U.S. officials said. The officials said the Obama administration remains opposed to introducing more arms into the conflict.

[JORDANSYR]

Gen. Dempsey’s comments suggested the rebels could change that. “They’ve been listening to what we’ve been saying—not only us but the international community—that there has to be some coherence to their effort,” he told reporters with him aboard a military aircraft after a four-day trip to Latin America. But he said he wasn’t currently recommending that the rebels have come far enough to support giving them weapons.

The Saudi request to Jordan adds to sentiment that Arab leaders have hit the wall in their efforts to resolve Syria’s impasse diplomatically. Top officials from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab nations were notably absent from Thursday’s Arab League summit in Baghdad, where leaders called on Damascus to adopt a United Nations plan to stop fighting and begin political dialogue. The plan doesn’t call for Mr. Assad to step aside, as the Arab nations had sought. Mr. Assad said Thursday he would support the U.N. plan, but only once foreign countries stopped aiding rebels.

Many Middle East officials view Saudi Arabia’s arming of Afghan jihadis in the 1980s, through official and unofficial channels, as a prime contributor to the Afghan civil war and the rise of violent Islamic jihad. That has led to worries in many countries over the prospect of Saudi Arabia arming Syrian rebels now.

In Baghdad, Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki warned that arming the Syrian opposition could invite a repeat of the insurgency and sectarian strife that consumed Iraq for years after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. “It will lead to regional and global proxy wars in the Syrian arena,” he said.

Jordanian officials said they are unlikely to resist Saudi pressure for long. “We are a non-interventionist country. But if it becomes force majeure, you have to join—this is the story of Jordan,” said a top Jordanian official.

An arrangement between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, even if informal, would mark the first attempt to send in large quantities of weapons to Syria’s rebels. Limited, individual smuggling efforts have so far supplied Assad opponents with light arms, say rebels and locals near the Syrian borders with Lebanon and Iraq.

Rebel fighters fleeing escalating regime attacks on anti-Assad strongholds, including Idlib and the Baba Amr neighborhood of Homs, have said they are running out of ammunition, arms and supplies of medicine and other aid. They have said that the Syrian government has blocked traditional smuggling routes.

The officials didn’t say what sort of arms Saudi Arabia would propose sending.

The United States has long been Saudi Arabia’s leading weapons supplier, and the kingdom has high-end U.S. weaponry such as F-15 fighter jets, Patriot air-defense systems and Abrams main battle tanks. Such weapons are unlikely to end up in the hands of Syrian rebels; even smaller U.S.-made weapons, such as anti-tank missiles, are typically covered by strict terms that prevent re-export. Saudi Arabia’s arsenal also includes rocket and missile systems, grenades and field artillery.

Syria’s government—led by Alawites, whose faith is an offshoot of Shiite Islam—has been at odds with the Sunni kingdom for a decade. Saudi leaders believe Mr. Assad is repressing his majority Sunni population.

During last month’s Friends of Syria meeting in Tunisia, which brought together opposition supporters including Saudi Arabia and the U.S., Saudi’s Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal said arming the rebels was “an excellent idea.”

Jordanian officials point to Iraq as a precedent, saying they would expect to support the rebels at the last minute, when sentiment to arm them peaks.

Jordan at first denounced the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq but later aided the war effort, despite the lucrative oil deals it held with Iraq. “We have to have both feet on the ground. Do you think we could have turned the tide against the U.S. [Iraq] invasion? Why would Syria be different?” another Jordanian official said.

Jordan bought Iraqi oil at well below market values for over a decade before 2003, receiving much of it free in exchange for keeping diplomatic relations strong. Now, Jordan is incurring big budget losses as it buys increasingly expensive oil that it subsidizes at home. These expenditures are contributing to a budget deficit that by international estimates will run 7.5 percent to 10 percent of gross domestic product this year.

Jordan remains nervous about arming the rebels, worried that a larger conflict in Syria could engulf the region. Adding to these concerns are beliefs by several governments that extremist groups such as al Qaeda are now actively fighting against Mr. Assad’s government, and that they may have been behind bombings in Damascus and Aleppo, Syria’s two largest cities. In 2005, Amman was hit by three bombings in one day, seen as retaliation for its support to the U.S. in the Iraq war.

“You have to be very careful who you arm and don’t arm. We don’t quite know who this opposition is,” said a third Jordanian official.

The Syrian crisis is already affecting Jordan’s economy. Before the conflict, about 70% of Jordan’s imports and about 25% of its exports were routed through Syria, according to the country’s Transport Ministry, which didn’t provide dollar figures. Now those imports and exports have fallen to virtually zero, the ministry says.

To help alleviate economic woes, the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, have pumped billions of dollars into Jordan’s coffers. Saudi Arabia alone gave nearly $1.5 billion in grants to help Jordan manage its deficit last year, while the U.S. government says it earmarked $660 million in assistance to Jordan in 2012.

Jordan, which abuts Saudi Arabia and shares a border of nearly 250 miles with Syria, would be the most direct conduit for Saudi arms to the rebels.

Lebanon and Iraq also border Syria, but influential blocs of these countries’ governments are sympathetic to Mr. Assad. Turkey supports Syria’s opposition, but any Saudi arms delivered through Turkey would have to cross land, seas or airspace of countries that support Mr. Assad’s government.

Jordan may argue it needs additional aid to help it support the influx of Syrians since the bloodshed began a year ago. More than 90,000 Syrians have crossed into Jordan since then, the government says, more than to any other country. More than 6,000 Syrians have registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to receive aid, while the rest live in cramped apartments, with several families sharing a few rooms.

Earlier this month, according to refugees and a Jordanian border police officer, a pregnant Syrian woman was fleeing across the rolling green hills of the border with her husband and eight-year-old son when Syrian snipers fired on the family.

The officer said he opened fire on the snipers to provide cover for the family. “This was for humanity. It came from the heart, not orders from above,” the officer said.

The officer said he took the family to the hospital. Some refugees staying in homes near the border say she died during labor.

Several of these refugees said the Jordanian border police have helped them return to Syria with medical supplies, informing them when Syrian snipers are stationed in their towers or when troops are on patrol.

The government of Jordan—which, like Syria’s opposition, is largely Sunni—hasn’t cracked down on such actions.

“You’ll see it’s quiet now,” the police officer said, gesturing to the open field dotted with dandelions and Syrian guard towers. “But they’ll start running over the border once its dark.”

—Adam Entous, Summer Said, Suha Ma’ayeh, Nour Malas, Nathan Hodge and Jay Solomon contributed to this article.

For Syrians, No Easy Exit From Conflict #Syria

Anne Barnard 20/03/12

BEIRUT, Lebanon — Syria is locked in an ominous and violent stalemate: With overwhelming firepower and a willingness to kill, President Bashar al-Assad could hold on to power for months or even years, keeping the opposition from controlling any territory and denying it breathing space to develop a coherent, effective leadership, according to analysts, diplomats and Syrians involved in the uprising.

Syrians and regional analysts say sheer force alone is unlikely to eradicate what has become a diffuse and unpredictable insurgency, one able to strike out even after the government has used crushing force against centers of resistance like Homs, Idlib and Dara’a. Broad areas of the country are hostile territory for government troops, and attackers have managed to hit centers of power, even in the capital, Damascus.

But with so much blood spilled, diplomacy stalled and both sides refusing to negotiate, there is no obvious path out. That has made Syria stand out among the countries swept up in the regional Arab revolts, impervious to a sustained popular uprising and so far beyond the reach of outside intervention. It has become a war of attrition that grows more dangerous as it goes along.

Many Syrians say that Mr. Assad cannot afford to stop shooting and can never go back to ruling as he did before, when his authority stemmed from the bonds of sect, business interests and fear. If he dials back his repression, Syrians of many political stripes say with certainty, citizens will demand his ouster.

“We will see millions of protesters in the streets, not hundreds,” said a Christian engineer in the old city of Damascus, who, like many people interviewed recently in Syria, refused to be fully identified for fear of reprisal. “And the regime knows that.”

The reverberations of a protracted sectarian conflict in Syria have begun to spread across a region where the geopolitical calculus is already being altered. Tensions have spilled over borders into Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan and raised fears that radical Islamic militants will find a new cause for recruitment.

The quickest ways out — if Mr. Assad were to leave, or if insiders were to stage a coup — also seem highly unlikely, analysts said. Insulated from all but his inner circle, Mr. Assad appears to believe that his strategy is succeeding.

The security officials who might be able to overthrow him now see their fates intertwined with his. The public has suffered too much to be satisfied with a coup alone; they would seek the entire security system’s downfall and, possibly, revenge.

“We’ll see this society, which has been bullied into despair, resort to desperate means,” said Peter Harling of the International Crisis Group. “We’re talking about hundreds of thousands of people pushed to the brink.”

The reliance on force has produced short-term results, but at a cost, leaving Mr. Assad’s base fraying as the economy implodes.

Some members of the constituencies Mr. Assad counts on — Sunni Muslim business elites, the Christian minority, state employees and ambitious young urbanites — said last week in Syria that they had lost faith in the government and no longer believed its claims of victory.

Reem, a government health worker who said she long supported Mr. Assad but now tends wounded protesters in a field hospital, summed up the president’s options: “Kill all Syrian protesters or leave in peace to save the country,” she said as her mother served coffee at their home in a Damascus suburb.

Some of the government’s questionable business ties also appear to be coming undone.

In a currency-exchange office in downtown Damascus recently, customers anxiously haggled for dollars. The proprietor, Anas, 25, said that in early March, black market currency traders enraged at the arrests of some of their colleagues broke a “gentleman’s agreement” with the state to keep informal dollar rates relatively close to official ones. That has helped drive up prices for sugar and basic goods, which rose more in recent weeks than in the previous year.

“I am not anti-Assad, but I cannot support the government of President Bashar al-Assad, which offers nothing for me,” said Yusef, 40, a government employee. He said he lost his temper recently with a shopkeeper who, asked the price of cooking oil, dialed his cellphone to ask the dollar rate — a common practice nowadays.

Electricity cuts chill and darken homes and create bread shortages, even in the capital. Sixty cars lined up for gas recently near the historic Hijaz train station in central Damascus, an unprecedented sight.

Yusef said he and his wife earned a combined 35,000 Syrian pounds a month, worth $729 in early March and about half that when the price of dollars spiked last week.

“The government sells us silly propaganda on its victories in Homs, Baba Amr or Idlib,” he said, citing assaults on rebel strongholds. “But we need food and electricity, not honeyed promises.”

He called the intractable economic crisis “the tipping point for middle-class and poor residents, who have begun to change their political views.”

Bilal, a Sunni Muslim businessman, proudly displays a picture of his father with the former president, Hafez al-Assad, above his expensive leather sofa. He said: “We need a solution, whether it is to keep President Assad in power or not. We don’t want to spend our lives organizing pro-Assad demonstrations.”

Most Sunni businesspeople have already switched sides, with many giving money to families of people killed in the uprising, said Mr. Harling. But they lack the power to overthrow Mr. Assad. The only force that can do that, besides reluctant security elites, is the army.

Mr. Assad’s level of confidence in the conscript army is unclear; by choice or necessity his forces have moved from town to town rather than trying simultaneous assaults. Troops returning from pitched battles appear well rested and well trained, with well-maintained new weapons and vehicles decked in flags, as if fresh from defeating a foreign enemy, said Mr. Harling, who lives part time in Syria.

Mr. Assad seems unconcerned with restoring ties with the religious Sunni Muslim working class in provincial cities devastated by fighting, Mr. Harling said. Instead, he said, Mr. Assad has consolidated his base among minority Alawites, the heterodox Muslim sect he belongs to, and Christians, who represent about a fifth of the country.

But even the mild reforms Mr. Assad promises would come at the expense of those allies. Already, prominent Christians have voiced outrage at the new Constitution, approved in a referendum held last month amid widespread fighting and widely discounted as illegitimate. It requires the president of Syria, long a resolutely secular state, to be a Muslim.

As an insurgency takes hold, some opposition activists are uncomfortable with the bloodier tactics of armed groups who fight on their side but not under their control. There have been mysterious car bombings, roadside bombs and massacres of families, including the stabbing of children — a visceral form of violence rare in the region, even amid sectarian bloodletting in Iraq. Each side blames the other.

Thamer, a Syrian activist interviewed on Skype, expressed “many doubts and fears” about the tactics of loosely-knit armed groups called the Free Syrian Army. He blamed them for picking fights that civilians ultimately lose. “If you know you don’t have enough weapons, what are you doing?” he said.

But what they lack in weapons and unity, the activists make up in resolve. A wealthy Sunni Muslim student at Aleppo University said via Skype that his father, who had opposed his involvement, now drives him to protests.

Last week, he said, he watched fellow protesters at the university — in Syria’s commercial hub, long a bastion of government support — advance under government fire. “They weren’t afraid,” he said. “They attacked a security man and beat and threw rocks and stones at him until he died. You think these people will stop now?

Turkey considering “buffer zone” along #Syria border

Mar. 16 - Turkey’s Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan is considering setting up a safe area inside Syria to tackle the flow of refugees fleeing the conflict. Deborah Lutterbeck reports.

#Syria: ‘The children can escape the country, but they can’t escape the conflict and fear’

 

BAALBEK

 
FRIDAY 16 MARCH 2012

Mona flinches each time she hears a bang in the chaotic refuge in the Lebanese mountains that has been her home for a week. The five-year-old wears several layers of baggy, boys’ clothes and clutches a ragged, blue bear. “I always get scared. My father is in Syria so I worry a lot about him,” she says. Bed-wetting and terrorised wails are nightly features of the lives of the 30 children who fled Homs and Qusayr, a nearby village, with their five mothers in two convoys last week.

Some of the children are boisterous and grapple for attention. Others sit in silence, their eyes dart around and their heads jolt each time the louder ones clap or smack the floor. Others sit in the centre of the room, frenziedly banging the carpet and imitating the chant leaders so familiar in videos of Syria’s protests.

“I know what they say at the demonstrations,” shouts Mona. In perfect unison they sing a chant about the revolutionaries of every Syrian town: “In Latakia they are safe, thank God; in Homs are the brave.” Each new rhyme they recite is more sinister – calling for the Shabiha, the regime’s militias, and Bashar al-Assad, to be hanged, for Muammar Gaddafi’s fate to befall them. The children belt out the words with a tragic glee. “We will not sleep until the ass steps aside,” cries 11-year-old Ala. When he grows up he insists he will be “the great leader of the revolution”.

Mona wants to become a doctor to help the wounded. “I was shot in the back,” she shouts, clasping a hand over her spine. She lifts her top to reveal her back is unscathed and giggles. The family says she wants to be like her mother, who has shrapnel from mortars lodged in her arm. They gather around a cast iron heater in the snow-capped mountain town. All live in three rooms, housed by a local NGO called the Islamic Group.

The assault on Homs and Qusayr intensified two months ago. When the breaks between the children’s screams narrowed and shrapnel burst in through the windows, five families decided to flee. They left the two neighbouring towns for the Baalbek mountains in Lebanon, smuggled across by those they describe as “good people”.

“We changed cars every six minutes,” says Ala. His mother says it was every 15, during a three-hour, 100km journey. Men who intimately knew their patch and the sniper positions bundled the children into a desperate relay of vehicles until they reached safety. The men stayed behind to defend the town. During a break in the bombardment the women packed a few possessions and left. Nearby buildings had been gutted by blasts and it was only a matter of time before their homes would be hit.

For months the children had not dared to go outside. Their homes were often immersed in total darkness as the electricity failed. They lived off meagre rations from last year’s harvest and had limited supplies of water as shells had hit the tanks on the roofs.

“Even if the children can escape the country, they often can’t escape the conflict and the fear it creates,” says Andrew Wander, emergencies media manager at Save the Children. His organisation is scrambling to create projects to support the vast influx of children into countries bordering Syria. Some of the children have been orphaned; others have only one parent left.

Two of the children in the crammed Baalbek home have a rare condition they call sumak – or fish – because it turns skin grey and scaly. It is an extreme form of psoriasis that has been left untreated for months. Ala, one of the sufferers, is prematurely aged, his raw and angry skin stretched over his bones. He perpetually forces a smile through cracked skin, but his face falls when he believes no one is looking. Every medical facility had closed in Qusayr, and Lebanese doctors are unsure what to prescribe – they have never seen such a severe case. He has the gravelled and wizened voice of an old man: “In Syria life is miserable,” he says.

“We know the children here in Lebanon are just the tip of the iceberg; there are many still in Syria and to get to them we need full humanitarian access,” says Mr Wander, who is desperate for the Syrian government to permit the creation of an aid corridor to reach those most in need.

Ala’s older brother, 14-year-old Mohammed, sits sullenly disengaged in the corner. He only looks up when the homeowner says he is unsure how long he can host them. It is clear he feels the burden of responsibility for his sprawling family, catapulted into this position by the grim turn of events. When questioned Mohammed gives curt, often untrue, answers. Asked if he joined the demonstrations, he says he did not. But his mother, 42-year-old Tfaha, says: “He did, he went every day – I encouraged him.”

Mohammed later admits he would like to join the Free Syrian Army. Would he not be scared? “No, I’d know I was defending our honour and our country.

United States and Russia clash over #Syria at UN

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton addresses a news conference at United Nations headquarters, Monday, March 12, 2012.(AP / Richard Drew)


Updated: Mon Mar. 12 2012 13:01:04

The Associated Press

The United States and Russia clashed over Syria at the UN Monday after Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged the divided Security Council to speak with one voice and help the Mideast nation “pull back from the brink of a deeper catastrophe.”

Washington and Moscow both called for an end to the bloody yearlong conflict — but on different terms, leaving in doubt prospects of breaking a deadlock in the council over a new resolution.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton rejected any equivalence between the “premeditated murders” carried by President Bashar Assad’s “military machine” and the civilians under siege driven to self-defence.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Syrian authorities “bear a huge share of responsibility” but insisted opposition fighters and extremists including al-Qaida are also committing violent and terrorist acts.

Lavrov said if the priority is to immediately end any violence and provide humanitarian aid to the Syrian people “then at this stage we should not talk about who was the first to start, but rather discuss realistic and feasible approaches which would allow (us) to achieve the cease-fire as a priority.”

Clinton declared that the Security Council cannot “stand silent when governments massacre their own people, threatening regional peace and security in the process.”

The ministerial debate in the council on challenges from last year’s Arab Spring was dominated by the yearlong conflict in Syria, which has killed over 7,500 people, according to the United Nations.

Secretary-General Ban, who led off the debate, said the conflict has led the entire region into uncertainty and subjected citizens in several cities to disproportionate violence.

Russia, which is Syria’s most powerful ally, and China have vetoed two U.S. and European-backed Security Council resolutions which would have condemned Assad’s bloody crackdown, saying they were unbalanced and demanded that only the government stop attacks, not the opposition. Moscow accused Western powers of fueling the conflict by backing the rebels.

Earlier this month, the United States proposed a new draft which tried to take a more balanced approach, but diplomats said Russia and China rejected it.

Lavrov flew to New York from Cairo, where he had a tense meeting with Arab League foreign ministers. They have endorsed a plan for Assad to hand power to his vice-president, but the Russians are adamantly opposed to any resolution endorsing regime change.

In the end, the Arab League and Lavrov agreed on a plan that the Russia foreign minister said could lead to an early solution of the Syrian crisis: an immediate cease-fire, a clause preventing foreign intervention, assurances about humanitarian aid, an impartial monitoring mechanism and an endorsement of the mission by former UN chief Kofi Annan, the new U.N.-Arab League special envoy to Syria.

Annan left Syria on Sunday without a deal to end the conflict, while regime forces mounted a new assault on rebel strongholds in the north.

On Monday, Annan met Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara and told reporters the diplomatic process would take time.

“This a very complex situation,” said Annan. “We are going to press ahead for humanitarian access, for the killings of civilians to stop, and that get everybody to the table to work out a political solution.”

Clinton told reporters after meeting privately with Lavrov that she appreciated the opportunity to discuss the way forward and pointed out to him “my very strong view that the alternative to our unity on these points will be bloody internal conflict with dangerous consequences for the whole region.”

She said everyone is waiting to hear Annan’s advice on the best way forward, and the U.S. hopes that after Monday’s council session and the recent meetings in Cairo and Damascus “we will be prepared in the Security Council to chart a way forward.”

Lavrov said separate discussions with Clinton and the British and French foreign ministers “indicated that there is a growing understanding of the need not to talk to each other on the basis of take it or leave it, but to bring the positions together and to be guided not by the desire of revenge or punishment, who is to blame … but by the interests of the Syrian people.”

On the sidelines, the Quartet of Mideast peace mediators — the UN, U.S., European Union and Russia — met behind closed doors on the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is witnessing the worst flare-up in violence in more than a year.

The ministerial meeting reviewed efforts to get the Palestinians and Israelis back to the negotiating table, but deep divisions remain and there is little hope of a breakthrough.

STATEMENT BY SENATORS McCAIN, LIEBERMAN AND GRAHAM ON THE SITUATION IN #Syria

March 6, 2012

Washington, D.C. ­– U.S. Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) today released the following statement on the situation in Syria:

“After a year of bloodshed, the crisis in Syria has reached a decisive moment.

“The United Nations has declared that Syrian security forces are guilty of crimes against humanity and that more than 7,500 lives have been lost. The kinds of mass atrocities that NATO intervened in Libya to prevent in Benghazi are now a reality in Homs and other cities across the country. Syria today is the scene of some of the worst state-sponsored violence since Milosevic’s war crimes in the Balkans. And the bloodshed continues, with no end in sight.

“What is all the more astonishing is that Assad’s killing spree has continued despite severe and escalating international pressure against him. This has been an impressive international effort, and the Obama Administration deserves credit for helping to orchestrate it.

“Unfortunately, this policy is increasingly disconnected from the dire situation on the ground in Syria, which has become a full-blown state of armed conflict. Despite a year’s worth of diplomacy backed by sanctions, Assad and his lieutenants show no signs of giving up. To the contrary, they appear to accelerating their fight to the finish. Unfortunately, with each passing day, the international response to Assad’s atrocities is being overtaken by events on the ground in Syria.

“Some countries are beginning to confront this reality, as well as its implications. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are calling for arming opposition forces in Syria. The newly-elected Kuwaiti parliament has called on their government to do the same. Most importantly, Syrians themselves are increasingly calling for international intervention, including military assistance. The opposition Syrian National Council recently announced that it is establishing a military bureau to channel weapons and other assistance to the Free Syrian Army and armed groups inside the country.

“To be sure, there are legitimate questions about the efficacy of intervention in Syria, and equally legitimate concerns about its risks and uncertainties. It is understandable that the Administration is reluctant to move beyond diplomacy and sanctions. But our current policy is not succeeding, and the current course is no longer strategically or morally sustainable.

“For this reason, the time has come for a new policy. As we continue to isolate Assad diplomatically and economically, we should work with our closest friends and allies to support opposition groups inside Syria, both political and military, to help them organize themselves into a more cohesive and effective force that can put an end to the bloodshed and force Assad and his loyalists to leave power, which has been the goal of United States policy since August 2011.

“What opposition groups in Syria need most urgently is relief from Assad’s tank and artillery sieges in many cities that are still contested. Providing military assistance to the Free Syrian Army and other opposition groups is necessary, but as Assad continues to intensify his assault, that alone will not be sufficient to stop the slaughter and save innocent lives. The only realistic way to do so is with foreign airpower.

“Therefore, if requested by the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army, the United States should help organize an international effort to protect civilian population centers in Syria through airstrikes on Assad’s forces. To be clear: This will first require the United States and our partners to suppress the Syrian regime’s air defenses in at least part of the country.

“This should not mean the United States must act alone. Any intervention should include Arab partners such as Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Jordan, and Qatar, and willing allies in the E.U. and NATO, the most important of which in this case is Turkey.

“The ultimate goal of airstrikes should be to protect civilian population centers from Assad’s killing machine and establish safe havens in which opposition forces can organize, rest, refit, and plan their political and military activities against Assad. These safe havens could serve as platforms for the delivery of humanitarian and military assistance – including weapons and ammunition, body armor and other personal protective equipment, tactical intelligence, secure communications equipment, food and water, and medical supplies. These safe havens could also help the Free Syrian Army and other armed groups in Syria to train and organize themselves into more cohesive and effective military forces, likely with the assistance of foreign partners, and provide political space for the Syrian National Council to organize on Syrian soil.

“The benefit for the United States in helping to lead this effort directly is that it would allow us to better empower those Syrian groups that share our interests – those groups that reject Al-Qaeda and the Iranian regime, and commit to the goal of an inclusive democratic transition, as called for by the Syrian National Council. If we stand on the sidelines, others will try to pick winners, and this will not always be to our liking or in our interest.

“There will be no UN Security Council mandate for such an operation. Russia and China took that option off the table long ago. But let’s not forget: NATO took military action to save Kosovo in 1999 without formal U.N. authorization. There is no reason why the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), or NATO, or a leading coalition within the Friends of Syria contact group, or all of them speaking in unison, could not provide international legitimacy for military measures to save Syria today.

“Are there dangers, and risks, and uncertainties in this approach? Absolutely. There are no ideal options in Syria. All of them contain significant risk. Many people will be quick to raise concerns about the course of action we are proposing. Many of these concerns have merit, but none so much that they should keep us from acting.

“For example, it is often said that we should not assist the opposition in Syria militarily because we don’t know who these people are, or that by doing so, we could end up benefiting Al-Qaeda or Hamas. In fact, the surest way for Al-Qaeda to gain a foothold in Syria is for us to turn our backs on those brave Syrians who are fighting for their lives.

“Another objection to intervention is that the conflict has become a sectarian civil war, and our involvement would enable the Sunni majority to take revenge against the Alawite minority. This is a serious and legitimate concern, but it is only growing worse the longer the conflict goes on. Furthermore, the risks of sectarian conflict will exist in Syria whether we get more involved or not. If we work to assist the armed opposition now, we will at least have some ability to try to mitigate these risks. Engagement with these groups is the best way to understand them better, to seek to establish trust and influence with them, because we took their side when they needed it most.

“We should not overstate the potential influence we could gain with the armed opposition in Syria, but it will only diminish the longer we wait to offer meaningful support, and what we can say for certain is that we will have no influence whatsoever with these people if they feel we abandoned them.

“We also hear it said that we should not contribute to the militarization of the conflict. If only Russia and Iran shared that sentiment. Instead, they are shamelessly aiding Assad’s killing machine. We need to deal with reality as it is, not as we wish it to be – and the reality in Syria today is a one-sided fight where the aggressors are hardly lacking for military means thanks to the intervention of foreign powers.

“There are always plenty of reasons not to do something, and we can list them clearly in the case of Syria. We know there are divisions in the opposition and among the armed resistance inside the country. We know that some elements of the opposition may sympathize with violent extremist ideologies or harbor dark thoughts of sectarian revenge. We know that many of Syria’s immediate neighbors remain cautious about taking overly provocative actions to undermine Assad. And we know the American people are weary of conflict – justifiably so – and would rather focus on domestic problems.

“These are realities, but while we are compelled to acknowledge them, we are not condemned to accept them forever. With resolve, principled leadership, and wise policy, we can shape better realities. That is what the Syrian people have done.

“By no rational calculation should this uprising against Assad still be going on. The Syrian people are outmatched. They are outgunned. They are lacking for food, and water, and other basic needs. They are confronting a regime whose disregard for human dignity and capacity for sheer savagery is limitless. For an entire year, the Syrian people have faced death, and those unspeakable things worse than death, and still they have not given up. Still they take to the streets to protest peacefully for justice. Still they carry on their fight. And they do so on behalf of many of the same universal values we share, and many of the same interests as well.

“The people who are fighting for freedom in Syria are natural allies. They have expanded the boundaries of what everyone thought was possible in Syria. They have earned our respect, and now they need our support to finish what they started. The Syrian people deserve a chance at freedom, and shame on us if we fail to help them now in their moment of greatest need.”